



Strong Software Reliability for Autonomous Space Robotics

Marie Farrell

March 31, 2023

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Strong Software Reliability for Autonomous 5

March 31, 2023

Background: Me

- PhD at Maynooth University: 2013–2017
- Postdoc at Universities of Liverpool and Manchester: 2018–2020 (FAIR-SPACE Hub)
- Postdoc at Maynooth University: 2020–2022 (VALU3S Project)
- Royal Academy of Engineering Research Fellow at The University of Manchester: 2022–2027









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Strong Software Reliability for Autonomous Space Robotics







Problem:

- Space exploration necessitates the use of **autonomous** robotic systems.
- Current **verification** approaches are **not sufficient** to accurately specify the required autonomy.
- Autonomy introduces a unique set of concerns related to verification and assurance.

Strong Software Reliability for Autonomous Space Robotics







Aim:

• Devise new ways of **describing**, **analysing** and **assuring** the correct autonomous behaviour of robotic space systems.

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Software Development: V-Model



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Integrating Multiple Heterogeneous Verification Techniques

- True autonomy requires a step change in understanding and verification.
- Issue of autonomous systems assurance remains unsolved.
- Adopt a sophisticated and complementary combination of robust V&V methods to support deployment in space.
- Provide formalisation of requirements for Machine Learning components.



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Impact

This will ultimately lead to more **reliable**, more **usable** and more **effective** autonomous robots being deployed more **confidently** across a **range of sectors**.



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What Should I Verify?

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Requirements Engineering



Illustration: The overall requirements engineering process

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Requirement: Robots should always maintain a safe distance from astronauts.

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Formal Methods



What Should I Verify?

Natural Language Requirements \neq Formal Properties

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Natural-Language Requirements: Aircraft Engine Software Controller

During regulation of nominal system operation (no change in pilot input), controller operating mode shall appropriately switch between nominal and surge/stall prevention operating state.



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Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET)



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Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET)



- supports the formalisation, understanding and analysis of requirements user-friendly interface
- intuitive diagrammatic explanations of requirement semantics
- users specify requirements in restricted natural language, called FRETISH, which embodies a temporal logic semantics

Example: Rover Navigation



Bourbouh, H., Farrell, M., Mavridou, A., Sljivo, I., Brat, G., Dennis, L. A., & Fisher, M. Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study. NFM 2021.

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Rover Architecture



R1: The rover shall not run out of battery.R2: The rover shall not collide with an obstacle.R3: The rover shall visit all reachable points of interest.

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Rover Requirement in FRET

Update Requirement		Status	ASSISTANT	TEMPLATES
Requirement ID PL R1.2 R Rationale and Comments Rationale Charging station shall be select to true Comments	erent Requirement ID Project	Anarge flag is set	ENFORCED: In the interval defined by TRIGGER: first point in the interval if of point in the interval where (re-charge) b REQUIRES: for every trigger, if trigger i at the same time point. Beginning of Time TC TC = (recharge), Response = (got	he entire execution. Icharge) is true and any comes true (from faile). Iolds then RES also holds Ids then RES also holds Id = chargePosition).
Requirement Description]	Diagram Semantics	~
A requirement follows the sentence structure information on a field format, click on its cor	orsponding bubble.	EST	Future Time LTL	~
if recharge GRA shall immediately	satisfy goal=chargePosition		Past Time LTL (H (((recharge) & ((Y (! (rec -> (goal = chargePosition))) Target: GRA component.	**************************************
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Verifying Rover Navigation

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Example: Aircraft Engine Controller

ID	FRETISH
UC5_R_1	if ((sensorfaults) & (trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (controlObjectives)
UC5_R_2	if ((sensorfaults) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (controlObjectives)
UC5_R_3	if ((sensorfaults) & (trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (operatingLimitObjectives)
UC5_R_4	if ((sensorfaults) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (operatingLimitObjectives)
UC5_R_5	if ((mechanicalFatigue) & (trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (controlObjectives)
UC5_R_6	if ((mechanicalFatigue) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (controlObjectives)
UC5_R_7	if ((mechanicalFatigue) & (trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (operatingLimitObjectives)
UC5_R_8	if ((mechanicalFatigue) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (operatingLimitObjectives)
UC5_R_9	$if ((lowProbabilityHazardousEvents) \& (trackingPilotCommands)) \ Controller \ {\tt shall \ satisfy} \ (controlObjection of the state of$
	tives)
UC5_R_10	if ((lowProbabilityHazardousEvents) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (controlOb-
	jectives)
UC5_R_11	$if ((lowProbabilityHazardousEvents) \& (trackingPilotCommands)) \ Controller \ {\tt shall \ satisfy} \ (operatingLim-interval and the state of the st$
	itObjectives)
UC5_R_12	if ((lowProbabilityHazardousEvents) & (!trackingPilotCommands)) Controller shall satisfy (operat-
	ingLimitObjectives)
UC5_R_13	if (trackingPilotCommands) Controller shall satisfy (changeMode(nominal)) (changeMode(surgeStall-
	Prevention))
UC5_R_14	if (!trackingPilotCommands) Controller shall satisfy (changeMode(nominal)) (changeMode(surgeStall-
	Prevention))

Farrell, M., Luckcuck, M., Sheridan, O., & Monahan, R. *FRETting about requirements: formalised requirements for an aircraft engine controller.* In REFSQ 2022.

Formalised Requirements for an Aircraft Engine Controller

ID	Parent	FRETISH
UC5_R_1.1	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i),y(i)) > E)$ if $((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S))$
		<nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null) & (pilot Input => setThrust = V2) &
		(observedThrust = V1)) Controller shall until (diff(r(i),y(i)) < e) satisfy (settlingTime)
		>= 0) & (settlingTime <= settlingTimeMax) & (observedThrust = V2)
UC5_R_1.2	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i),y(i)) > E)$ if $((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S))$
		<nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null)& (pilotInput => setThrust = V2) &
		(observedThrust = V1)) Controller shall until $(diff(r(i),y(i)) < e)$ satisfy $(overshoot > =$
		0) & (overshoot \leq overshootMax) & (observedThrust = V2)
UC5_R_1.3	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i), y(i)) > E)$ if $((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S) < Constraints)$
		nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null)& (pilot Input => setThrust = V2)& (ob-
		servedThrust = V1)) Controller shall until $(diff(r(i),y(i)) < e)$ satisfy (steadyStateError
		>= 0) & (steadyStateError <= steadyStateErrorMax) & (observedThrust = V2)

• 14 natural-language requirements became 42 formalised requirements

Formalised Requirements for an Aircraft Engine Controller

ID	Parent	FRETISH
UC5_R_1.1	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i),y(i)) > E)$ if $((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S))$
		<nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null) & (pilot Input => setThrust = V2) &
		$(observedThrust = V1)) \ Controller \ {\mbox{shall}} \ until \ (diff(r(i),y(i)) < e) \ {\mbox{satisfy}} \ (settlingTime$
		>= 0) & (settlingTime <= settlingTimeMax) & (observedThrust = V2)
UC5_R_1.2	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i),y(i)) > E)$ if $((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S))$
		<nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null)& (pilot Input => setThrust = V2) &
		$(observedThrust = V1)) \ Controller \ {\tt shall} \ until \ (diff(r(i),y(i)) < e) \ {\tt satisfy} \ (overshoot > =$
		0) & (overshoot \leq overshootMax) & (observedThrust = V2)
UC5_R_1.3	UC5_R_1	when $(diff(r(i),y(i)) > E)$ if((sensorValue(S) > nominalValue + R) (sensorValue(S) <
		nominal Value - R) (sensor Value(S) = null)& (pilot Input => setThrust = V2)& (ob-
		$servedThrust = V1)) \ Controller \ {\tt shall} \ until \ (diff(r(i),y(i)) < e) \ {\tt satisfy} \ (steadyStateError$
		>= 0) & (steadyStateError <= steadyStateErrorMax) & (observedThrust = V2)

• 14 natural-language requirements became 42 formalised requirements



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'it forces you to think about the actual meaning behind the natural-language requirements'. - Collins Aerospace/UTRC Ireland

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Example: Active Debris Removal



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Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal

ID	FRET Formalisation
R1	SV shall satisfy (grasp(TGT, BGP) & closer(SV, TGT))
R1.1	Camera shall satisfy distance(Camera, TGT) \geq 0.5
R1.2	TGT shall satisfy if !contact(SVA, TGT) then motionless(TGT)
R1.3	Camera shall satisfy valid(p)
R1.3.1	Camera shall satisfy $maxRes(p) = 1280*720$
R1.3.2	Camera shall satisfy $length(p) > 0$
R1.4	${\sf Imagepreprocessing \ shall \ satisfy \ length(filteredimage) \leq {\sf length(p) \ \& \ length(filteredimage) > 0}$
R1.5	Findoptimalgrasp shall satisfy if exists(BGP) then return(BGP)
R.1.5.1	Findoptimalgrasp shall satisfy offset(BGP, TGT) = 1 & -20 \leq fingersurfaceyaw & fingersurfaceyaw \leq 20
R1.5.2	findoptimallgrasp shall satisfy length(grasps) \geq 0
R1.6	Findoptimalgrasp shall satisfy if !(exists(BGP)) then printerror
R1.7	Controller shall satisfy executeJointTrajectory(SVA, BGP)
R1.8	SVA shall satisfy captured(TGT) \Rightarrow contactpoint(SVA, TGT) = BGP
R1.9	SV shall satisfy totalpulling distance \geq 0.3 & totalpulling distance \leq 0.5
R2	SV shall always satisfy !collide(SV, TGT)
R2.1	SV shall always satisfy !(position(SV) = position(TGT))
R2.2	SV shall always satisfy contactpoint(SVG, TGT) = BGP.
R2.2.1	SV shall satisfy if $!grasped$ then contactpoint(SV, TGT) = null
R2.2.2	SV shall satisfy if grasped then contactpoint(SVG,TGT) = BGP + errormargin
R2.3	SVG shall satisfy captured(TGT) \Rightarrow force = 180

Farrell, M., Mavrakis, N., Ferrando, A., Dixon, C., & Gao, Y. Formal Modelling and Runtime

Verification of Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal. Frontiers in Robotics and Al.

2022.

Image: Image:

What Can We Verify?

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Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal

```
method imagepreprocessing(t: real, p: array<Point>, v: real, nb: int, rf: real)
1
2
      returns (filteredimage: array<Point>)
    requires 0 < p.Length; // R1.3.2
3
    requires v > 0.0;
4
    ensures filteredimage.Length ≤ p.Length;//R1.4
5
    ensures filteredimage.Length > 0; // R1.4
6
7
8
     filteredimage := removeDepth(p, t); //remove distant points from p.
     filteredimage := downSample(filteredimage, v); / voxel representation of p.
9
10
     filteredimage := filter(filteredimage, nb, rf); //removes noise and speckles.
11
```

R1.4:



Autonomous Systems: ML and Explainability Requirements

- Very difficult to formalise correct functionality of ML and explanability.
- Very difficult to verify these systems.



Explainabilty Requirements in FRET: Nuclear Robotics

ID 🛧		Summary	
R1	Ð	Robot shall before go satisfy explain	
R10	θ	if routeChange & infoRequest Robot shall at the next timepoint satisfy provideReason	
R11	Ð	if planDeviation Robot shall immediately satisfy returnCurrentLocation	
R12	Ð	Robot shall always satisfy computeShortestPath(A,B)	
R13	O	Robot shall always satisfy (explainCurrentPath => returnCurrentPath) & (explainIntendedPath => returnIntendedPath) & followPath & noDeviations	
R14	Đ	Robot shall always satisfy (explainVisited => returnVisited) & (explainMeasurements => returnMeasurementOrigins)	
R15	Đ	if notOptimal Robot shall immediately satisfy explain	
R16	Ð	if pathImpossible Robot shall immediately satisfy returnAllOptions	
R17	Đ	Robot shall always satisfy provideHealthUpdate & selfRecoveryStrategyConfidence > acceptableThreshold	
R18A	O	Robot shall always satisfy avoidObstacles & minimiseRadRisk	1
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Explainabilty Requirements in FRET: Nuclear Robotics

Update Requirement		•	ASSISTANT	TEMPLATES
Requirement ID R10	Parent Requirement ID	Project NuclearExplainability -	ENFORCED: in the interval del point in the interval if <i>(routeCh</i> in the interval where <i>(routeCha</i> false). REQUIRES: for every tri	ined by the entire exec ange & infoRequest) Inge & infoRequest) b igger, RES must hold a
Rationale and Comment	S	~	Beginning of Time	тс
Requirement Description	a structure displayed below, wher	e fields are optional unless indicated	TC = (routeChange & ini	foRequest), Response
with "*". For information on a field f	format, click on its corresponding	g bubble.	Diagram Semantics	
if routeChange & infoReque provideReason	est Robot shall at the next	timepoint satisfy	Formalizations	
			Future Time LTL	
L		SEMANTICS	Past Time LTL	
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Requirements for Machine Learning

Req ID	Requirement
[RRAV-001]	The neural network shall output the cross track distance error (perpendicular distance
	from the rover to the centerline.) Error to truth must not exceed X.
[RRAV-002]	Neural network shall output cross track heading error (the angle between the rover
	heading and the centerline.) Error to truth must not exceed X.
[RRAV-003]	Upon receiving an image, the Neural Network shall output the distance and the angle
	within X seconds (latency).
[RRAV-004]	Neural network shall output a sensible distance: the value must be between 0 and half
	the width of the taxiway plus X (buffer X so that it can still report if it is off the taxiway).
[RRAV-005]	Neural network shall output a sensible angle: the value must be between -90 and 90
	degrees.
[RRAV-006]	The neural network shall achieve a minimum of X% accuracy on training and Y% accu-
	racy on testing.
[RRAV-007]	(Local robustness) The neural network shall be robust to small perturbations in the
	image (pixels).
[RRAV-008]	(Semantic variations) The neural network shall be robust to irrelevant variations in the
	scene.
[RRAV-009]	The neural network shall safely navigate intersections.
[RRAV-010]	The magnitude of the cross track distance error shall drop below X m within T seconds
	and remain there.
[RRAV-011]	The magnitude of the cross track heading error shall drop below X degrees within T
	seconds and remain there.
	 < □ > < @ > < ⊇ > < ⊇ < ○

Requirements for Machine Learning

Req ID	Requirement Pattern (source: NASA)
[IC-001]	The sw shall achieve an average PARAMETER value of X.
[IC-002]	The sw shall estimate PARAMETER to within $+ - X$ with a Y% confidence.
[IC-003]	The sw shall estimate the confidence of the PARAMETER estimate.
[IC-004]	The requirement shall be verified by measuring the average of the parameter over N repetitions.
[IC-005]	The sw shall estimate PARAMETER with an X% confidence interval of no more than $+ - Y$.
[IC-006]	The sw shall calculate the PARAMETER confidence interval at an $X\%$ confidence level.
[IC-007]	The sw shall calculate the PARAMETER as a probability distribution.
[IC-008]	The sw shall determine PARAMETER with a high level of confidence.
[IC-009]	The sw shall detect $X\%$ of occurrences of EVENT.
[IC-010]	The risk-ratio requirements shall be verified using a statistically significant set of SCENARIOS.
[IC-011]	The sw shall cause EVENT at a rate less than X times per Y DURATION.
[IC-012]	The sw shall detect CONDITION that implies EVENT is probable.
[IC-013]	The sw shall take action so that the risk ratio thresholds are satisfied.

Patterns derived from 770 mission/industrial requirements.

Farrell, M., Mavridou, A. & Schumann, J. *Exploring Requirements for Software that Learns: A Research Preview.* REFSQ 2023.

Are ML Requirements Special?

• Confidence, Criticality and Risk Levels:

"The sw shall determine PARAMETER with a high level of confidence."

• Accuracy as a measure of functional correctness:

"The neural network shall achieve a minimum of X% accuracy on training and Y% accuracy on testing."

Achievement of average value:

"The requirement shall be verified by measuring the average of the parameter over N repetitions."

Robustness:

"The neural network shall be robust to small perturbations in the image (pixels)."

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Are ML Requirements Special?

Yes!

- Probability plays a distinguishing role.

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Uncertainty in ML Requirements

Probabilities within requirements:
 "The sw shall detect CONDITION that implies EVENT is probable."

Probabilities about requirements: "The sw shall estimate PARAMETER to within + - X with a Y% confidence."

Summary

- Two important questions:
 - What Should I Verify?
 - What Can I verify?

• Tools like FRET can help.

- Requirements engineering for autonomous systems is very difficult.
 - ► Tools need to be able to capture requirements related to uncertainty.

• Heterogeneous/corroborative verification is the way forward.

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